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BOOK REVIEWS 
BONNIE C. BRENNAN AND KATHERINE GILBERT* 
THE PUZZLE PALACE: A REPORT ON AMERICA'S MOST SECRET 
AGENCY. By JAMES BAMFORD. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1982,465 pp., cloth. 
James Bamford's! recent book, The Puz.zle Palace,2 fills what has been an 
enduring gap ,in the literature on the U.S. intelligence community. With the 
exception of an occasional chapter in a more general work, the National Security 
Agency (NSA), dubbed by Bamford the "Puzzle Palace," has never been the 
subject of a major study. 
NSA is the technical agency charged with gathering signals intelligence 
(SIGINT),3 communications intelligence (COMINT)4 and electronics intelli-
* Both authors are candidates or the Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Degree at Fletcher School 
of Law and Diplomacy. A shorter version of this review together with selections from an interview with 
James Bamford appeared in 7 FLETCHER FORUM 205-15 (1983). 
1. James Bamford received his J.D. from Suffolk University Law Sehool. He credits the development 
of his investigatory skills to the job he held while going through law school with First Security Services 
for which he carried out insurance investigations. 
There has been some controversy as to the precise nature of Bamford's personal affiliation with NSA. 
Bamford served with the Naval Security Group (NSG), which mans many of NSA's listening posts, 
during the Viet Nam War. He was stationed in Hawaii from 1964-1967 and was employed as a clerk. 
Bamford maintains that the attention of the NSG was then focused on Viet Nam (a sui!ject purposefully 
left untouched in his book) and that the time he served with NSG gave him no insight into the 
operations of NSA back in Washington, D.C. 
Bamford also appeared before the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities (Senate Intelligence Committee), the findings of which he discusses at 
length in The Puzzle Palace. He was called before the Committee to testify about certain activities he had 
observed while in the Reserves on active duty. Again, he maintains that he has included nothing in the 
book regarding this, as it would violate his security clearance. 
In sum, Bamford has relied upon strictly external sources. All information appearing in The Puzzle 
Palace was available in the public forum. Bamford has merely gathered, culled and collated this 
information for public consumption. Interview with James Bamford (Oct. 16, (982). 
2. J. BAMFORD, THE PuZZLE PALACE: A REpORT ON AMERICA's MOST SECRET AGENCY (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as BAMFORD]. 
3. SIGINT: Signals Intelligence: comprises communications intelligence (COMIN1), electronics 
intelligence (ELI NT), foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (technical and intelligence informa-
tion derived from the collection and processing of foreign telemetry, beaconry, and associated signals), 
and information derived from the collection and processing of nonimagery infrared and coherent light 
signals S. 2525, National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978, quoted in id. at 441. 
4. COMINT: Communications Intelligence; the interception and processing of foreign communica-
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gence (ELINT).5 Its functions include eavesdropping, codemaking and code-
breaking. At its disposal is the most advanced computer and communications 
technology available. In The Puzzle Palace, Bamford is preoccupied with the 
ramifications of this technology on U.S. intelligence-gathering activities. He 
investigates whether the NSA has abused its extensive capabilities by focusing 
them on U.S. citizens; whether the NSA's extralegal status provides it with 
immunity where such abuses might have occurred; whether NSA operates to 
maximum effectiveness in its legitimate collection activities; and finally, whether 
NSA's counterintelligence procedures are adequate. 
HISTORY OF THE NSA 
According to Bamford the NSA's earliest American antecedent was the Black 
Chamber, formed during World War I to handle codebreaking responsibilities 
or cryptology. It was closed in 1929 by the new Secretary of State Henry L. 
Stimson, who announced that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail."6 
Cryptology, however, had by that time come to be recognized as a necessary 
component of U.S. intelligence activities. For the next two decades, cryptologic 
activities were dispersed throughout various branches of the State Department. 
Although reorganized numerous times, it was not until 1952 that a final reorga-
nization led to the creation of a single, centralized cryptological organization, the 
NSA. 
Bamford's treatment of the history of American 'cryptology, while thorough, 
is not original. His account of the origins of the modern NSA closely parallels 
David Kahn's version in his classic work The Codebreakers,7 which traces the 
history of cryptology from the tomb of Khnumhotep II through the mid-1960's. 
Bamford does, however, expand on Kahn's account by including material from 
interviews he conducted with Mrs. Edna Yardley and Marie S. Klooz.8 
tions passed by radio, wire, or other electromagnetic means, and by the processing of foreign encrypted 
communications, however transmitted. Interception comprises search, intercept, operator indentifica-
tion, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plain text, the fusion of these 
processes, and the reporting of results. Excluded from this definition are the interception and process-
ing of unencrypted written communications, press and propaganda broadcasts. National Security 
Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No.6, quoted in id. at 438. 
5. ELlNT: Electronics Intelligence; the collection (observation and recording) and the processing for 
subsequent intelligence purposes of information derived from foreign, noncommunications, elec-
tromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources. National 
Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No.6, quoted in id. at 439. 
6. /d. at 17. 
7. D. KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS: THE STORY OF SECRET WRITING (1967). 
S. Mrs. Yardley was the wife of Herbert O. Yardley, head of MI-S, or the famous "Black Chamber," 
which broke the Japanese diplomatic code, leading to an American diplomatic victory at the Washing-
ton Conference (1921-1922). BAMFORD,supra note 2, at 5-10. Yardley authored the controversial book, 
THE AMERICAN BLACK CHAMBER 1931) as well as JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC SECRETS. The latter, on which he 
collaborated with Marie Stuart Klooz, was never printed owing to governmental intervention. BAMFORD, 
supra note 2, at 19-25. 
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Bamford's real contribution lies in his gathering and assembling of informa-
tion on the structure and activities of the modern NSA which, until now, has 
been almost impossible to obtain. In a chapter appropriately entitled "Anat-
omy,"9 Bamford offers an expose of the structure of the "largest single espion-
age factory the free world [has] ever known."lo He details the size and organiza-
tion of the NSA's operational organizations, staff and support activities and 
devotes significant space to a description of NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, 
Maryland. 
In searching for information on NSA's recent activities, Bamford has done an 
admirable job of sifting through the discursive records of the Senate Intelligence 
Committee's investigations,l1 conducted during the mid-1970's, which revealed 
two alleged NSA abuses of power: Operations Shamrock and Minaret. 12 He 
offers gripping accounts of the Israeli assault on the U.S.S. Liberty in 1967 and 
the 1968 seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, revealing the NSA's role in the operation of 
both ships. Bamford touches upon still other events in recent history, e.g., the 
Pentagon Papers and Koreagate, disclosing NSA's little-known though sig-
nificant connection with each incident discussed. 
NSA MONITORING STATIONS REVEALED 
Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the book is Bamford's creative use of 
requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).13 Through this means 
9. BAMFORD. supra note 2, at 56-117. 
10. Id. at 56. 
II. U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GoVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTEL-
LIGENCE ACTIVITIES, BOOK I, FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE; BOOK II, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 
AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS; BOOK III, SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REpORTS ON INTELLIGENCE 
AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, FINAL REpORT S. REp. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
12. In Operation Shamrock the NSA, with the collusion of several major commercial cable com-
panies, monitored international telegram traffic either sent or received by American citizens. Launched 
in 1946, Shamrock was not terminated until 1975. In Operation Minaret, the communications of 
individuals and organizations involved in civil disturbances, antiwar movements/demonstrations and 
military deserters involved in antiwar movements were targeted. Minaret was initiated in 1969 and 
abandoned in 1973 at the behest of the attorney general. See BAMFORD, supra note 2, at 236-308. 
In both cases, the NSA was aware of the probable illegality of the operations. In an effort to keep the 
operation secret, the Minaret charter went so far as to state that: "An equally important aspect of 
MINARET will be to restrict the knowledge that information is being collected and processed by the 
National Security Agency." [d. at 254. 
13. The virtual anonymity of the NSA is protected by The National Security Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 
86-36, 73 STAT. 63 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 402), "the amazing little-known loophole that virtually 
excludes NSA from the burden of the Freedom of Information Act and allows the Agency to almost 
deny its own existence." BAMFORD, supra note 2, at 281. In an interview with the authors of this article, 
Bamford elaborated on how he overcame the restrictions on Pub. L. No. 86-36 and gained access to 
NSA newsletters and other documents relating to the NSA. By discovering that these newsletters had 
been made available to the families of NSA employees, he was able to succssfully argue that the NSA 
had waived Pub. L. No. 86-36 and that they fell under the FOIA. Interview with Bamford (Oct. 16, 
1982). 
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he has revealed the location of NSA microwave intercept stations III Sugar 
Grove, Virginia and Yakima, Washington. 
Here Bamford presents us with a vivid example in which the public's right -
or perhaps "need"? - to know hangs in delicate balance with national security. 
Bamford posits that the reason for the choice of the Sugar Grove and Yakima 
locations is their close proximity to COMSAT earth stations in Etam, West 
Virginia and Brewster, Washington. He thus implies that NSA's intent is to 
monitor the communications of American citizens. Through the Etam station 
alone "passes more than half of the commercial, international satellite communi-
cations entering and leaving the United States each day."14 In view of Operations 
Shamrock and Minaret, both of which monitored American citizen's communi-
cations, Bamford's reasoning seems plausible. 
On the other hand, "informed sources" have rejected Bamford's implication 
on two grounds. First, it is no:. the proximity of these stations to COMSAT earth 
stations that is their attraction, but rather the fact that "freedom from electronic 
interference enables them to pick up weak signals given off by Soviet satellites in 
deep space."15 Second, NSA simply does not have the resources to monitor the 
vast flow of communications passing through these stations. 16 
It has been suggested that NSA operations must remain secret to be effective. 
Philip Taubman, a Washington correspondent specializing in intelligence mat-
ters, asks: "What is the price of spelling out, as Mr. Bamford does, the exact 
location and capabilities of the NSA's worldwide listening posts? The trouble is 
that intelligence officials have too often used these kinds of legitimate concerns 
to shield questionable operations and to avoid public accountability."17 Similarly, 
Bamford argues that national security need not be damaged by informing the 
American public of NSA activities. He asserts that the Soviet Union has satellite 
photographic capabilities that would enable it to watch these stations being 
built. 18 
But the need for secrecy in national security operations should not be lightly 
brushed aside. In a telephone interview with William Colby, the former director 
of Central Intelligence posed the rhetorical question: "How many telecommuni-
cations installations do you think there are in the United States? Thousands!"19 
ld. 
14. BAMFORD, supra note 2, at 170. 
IS. Martin, Unveiling the Secret NSA, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 1982, at 28 [hereinafter cited as Martin]. 
16. ld. Martin notes: 
The volume of domestic and international communications has roughly doubled annually 
during the past 10 years while the number of NSA employees has fallen by a third. And while 
computers can sort through intercepted cables at high speeds - even in code - 90 percent of' 
the communications are by voice, and for that the NSA still needs a warm body wearing a set of 
headphones. 
17. Taubman, Sons of the Black Chamber, N.Y. Times Book Review, Sept. 19, 1982, at 28 (reviewing 
J. BAMFORD, THE PuZZLE PALACE (1982). 
18. Interview with James Bamford, published in 7 FLETCHER FORUM 205 (1983). 
19. Telephone interview by the authors with William Colby (Oct. 20, 1982). 
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The Soviet Union does not have the resources to focus on all of them. Bamford 
has now alerted the Soviet Union to the intelligence-gathering nature of two of 
these stations and given their locations. From this information Soviet analysts can 
deduce the kind of intelligence being gathered and frustrate future NSA ef-
forts.2o 
In Bamford's defense two points can be made. First we turn to Allen Dulles 
who writes: 
The fact that intelligence is alert, that there is a possibility of 
forewarning, could itself constitute one of the most effective deter-
rents to a potential enemy's appetite for attack. Therefore the fact 
that such a weapon of warning can be created should not be kept a 
secret but should be made well known, though the means and mechanics 
of warning should remain secret. 21 
Arguably, The Puzzle Palace makes this threat credible by establishing the exis-
tence of these vast resources. But, as the location of listening posts could be 
argued to constitute "a means," the positive impact may be mitigated. 
At another level, there is no provision in the Freedom of Information Act 
restricting foreign citizens from making use of the Act. In short, Tass could have 
made precisely the same inquiries which led Bamford to the discovery of these 
stations.22 Such overt intelligence methods are heavily relied on by the Soviet 
Union for information;23 the natural vulnerability of open societies is, of course, 
the free flow of information. It would, however, have taken an investment of 
Soviet resources, though perhaps not prohibitive, to achieve the same end.24 
20. Allen Dulles. director of Central Intelligence during the Eisenhower Administration. recalls a 
very similar occurrence entailing the discovery of the positioning in Cuba of Soviet medium-range 
missiles in late October of 1962. "Here. too. was an interesting case in which classical collection methods 
brought extremely valuable results. Various agents and refugees from Cuba reported that something in 
the nature of missile bases was being constructed and pinpointed the area of construction; this led to the 
gathering of proof by aerial reconnaissance." A. DULLES. THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE 68 (1963) 
[hereinafter cited as DULLES]. 
21. [d. at 51 (emphasis supplied). 
22. Senate Bill 1751. S. 1751. 97th Cong .• 1st Sess. (1981). introduced before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on October 20. 1981. was intended to restrict foreign citizens access to information released 
under the FOIA. A hearing was held on November 12. 1981 and the bill died in that Congress. 
23. Dulles writes: 
In countries that are free. where the press is free and the publication of political and 
scientific information is not hampered by the government. the collection of overt intelligence is 
of particular value and is of direct use in the preparation of our intelligence estimates. Since we 
. are that kind of country ourselves. we are subject to that kind of collection. The Soviets pick up 
some of their most valuable information about us from our publications. particularly from our 
technical and scientific journals. published transcripts of Congressional hearings and the like. 
DULLES. supra note 20. at 56. 
24. 
Similarly. at what may be substantial risk to V.S. national security. Bamford exposes the close 
relations of the NSA and its British counterpart. the General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). 
Justice Department documents Bamford obtained through FOIA requests "disclose that GCHQ inter-
cepted and gave the V.S. government telex communications from American citizens who had been 
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Bamford's book has freed the Soviets to utilize these resources in the pursuit of 
other intelligence objectives. 
BIG BROTHER? 
In an address at Berkeley, John F. Kennedy told his audience "In a time of 
turbulence and change, it is more true than ever that knowledge is power."25 
Turbulence and change are the standard of the U.S. intelligence community, 
while knowledge is its stock in trade. 
The greatest source of change in U.S. intelligence-gathering capabilities has 
been the impact of rapidly advancing technology. Two decades ago Allen Dulles 
wrote about those "special devices which have been developed to observe and 
record events, to replace in a sense the human hand and eye or to take over in 
areas which human capabilities cannot reach."26 Dulles listed the basic tools of 
technical collection as radar and accurate long-range photography.27 The U-2 of 
Dulles' days as director of the CIA has been superseded by the SR-71 Blackbird 
capable of achieving a speed of 2000 miles per hour and of photographing 
100,000 square miles in less than an hour from a height of 85,000 feet. 28 
Computers of Dulles' era, with circuitry less advanced than that of contemporary 
children's electronic toys, is now being replaced by analog optical computing 
technology, light-sound interaction devices and charge-transfer devices capable 
of achieving more than one quadrillion multiplications per second.29 
Bamford proceeds from the premise that if we have the technology we will use 
it - against Americans as well as our enemies. 30 He describes in detail the 
placed on a 'watch list' by the secret National Security Agency (NSA)." (1982 Reuters Ltd., Aug. 13, 
1982). There is evidence that the Reagan administration attempted to suppress publication of these 
findings. [d. 
One might again ask Taubman's question: "At what cost this disclosure?" Bamford argues that it has 
long been public knowledge that there has been a close working relationship between GCHQ and NSA. 
Dulles underscored the point when he wrote: 
One of the most gratifying features of recent work in intelligence, and one that is quite unique 
in its long history, has been the growing cooperation established between the American 
intelligence services and their counterparts throughout the Free World which make common 
cause with us as we face a common peril. 
DULLES, supra note 20, at 53-54. 
While the issue seems to be embarrassment over the fact that the GCHQ contributed to the illegal 
Minaret Operation, one might argue that fear of exposure may result in freezing the flow of informa-
tion for which we have a legitimate need in the future. Former DCI William Colby, himself a graduate 
of British intelligence school during World War II, stated that "We don't talk about our relations with 
other services. Every government has different standards for what it will reveal to the public. They don't 
want us talking about their business." Telephone interview by the authors with William Colby (Oct. 20, 
1982). 
25. Address by John F. Kennedy at the University of California, Berkeley (Mar. 23, 1962). 
26. DULLES, supra note 20, at 65. 
27. [d. at 66. 
28. BAMFORD, supra note 2, at 186. 
29. [d. at 102. 
30. His position is derivative of that of Senator Frank Church who opened hearings on the NSA by 
stating: 
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mammoth capabilities of the NSA to monitor, sort and analyze communications. 
He also notes that according to the yardsticks of budget and size, the NSA is the 
organization which clearly wields the most influence in the intelligence commu-
nity - even more than the CIA. 
Size and technical capabilities, however, are not themselves credible measures 
of power within the U.S.intelligence community. True influence lies with the 
policymaker. NSA, a strictly technical agency, does not itself determine targeting 
priorities. Target requirements are defined by COMINT consumers which in-
clude the CIA, FBI, State Department and the intelligence units of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force. NSA merely implements priorities established by other 
intelligence agenciesY Bamford might, therefore, be accused of "barking up the 
wrong tree." As Senator Tower testified before the Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee: 
Even if the risks [to our national security] were minimal- and I do 
not believe they are minimal - the NSA is the wrong target [for 
investigation]. The real quarry is not [sic] largely mechanical re-
sponse of military organizations to orders. The real issues of who 
told them to take actions now alleged to be questionable should be 
addressed to the policy level. It is more important to know why 
names were placed on a watch list than to know what the NSA did 
after being ordered to do SO.32 
NSA did, nonetheless, carry out orders that were clearly illegal. Is it possible 
NSA operations could take on Orwellian dimensions? For a number of reasons 
this seems unlikely. Though the protection it provides should not be overstated, 
it is an often forgotten tact that the NSA is composed of Americans who 
themselves have an interest in protecting the civil liberties from which they too 
benefit. 
Moreover, the NSA is subject to the scrutiny of the Department of Justice and 
various Congressional oversight committees. Attorney General Elliot Richardson, 
upon discovering the existence of Minaret, demanded a halt to that operation.33 
In a chain reaction, this led in turn to the cessation of Shamrock activities.34 In a 
chapter entitled "Fissures,"35 Bamford himself discusses at length the inquiries 
We have a particular obligation to examine the NSA. in light of its tremendous potential for 
abuse. It has the capacity to monitor the private communications of American citizens without 
the use of a "bug" or "tap." The interception of international communications signals sent 
through the air is the job of NSA; and. thanks to modern technological developments. it does 
its job very well. The danger lies in the ability of the NSA to turn its awesome technology 
against domestic communications. 
The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights: Hearings before the Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. 94th Cong .• 1st Sess. 2-3 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as Intelligence Activities Hearings]. 
31. See BAMFORD. supra note 2. at 49-55. 
32. Intelligence Activities Hearings. supra note 30. at 4 (statement of Sen. John G. Tower). 
33. BAMFORD. supra note 2. at 294. For a discussion of Minaret. see note 12 supra. 
34. BAMFORD. supra note 2. at 236. For a discussion of Shamrock. see note 12 supra. 
35. BAMFORD. supra note 2. at 280-308. 
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of the Senate Intelligence committee and the House Government Information 
Subcommittee. The findings of these committees provided the source material 
for much of his book. 
Finally, the Orwellian scenario assumes unlimited financial resources. As is the 
case with every federal agency, the NSA is subject to the budgetary constraints 
imposed by the Office of Management and Budget and Congressional appropri-
ations procedures. The NSA therefore must face all the distributional difficulties 
entailed by the finite resources that plague her sister agencies. 
NSA's LEGAL STATUS 
Bamford makes several well-taken points, however, on the extralegal status of 
the NSA.36 Despite the Senate Intelligence Committee's recommendation that 
the situation be rectified, NSA, which was created by an executive decree, 
National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 6 (NSCID 6), began 
without a legislative charter and continues to exist without one. Bamford builds 
a prima facie case that externally imposed legal constraints such as the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) established in lieu of a charter are in-
sufficient. 37 
FISA, signed into law by President Carter in 1978, establishes the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court.38 This court issues warrants enabling agencies, 
among them the NSA, to use electronic eavesdropping technology within the 
United States against foreign embassies, diplomats and agents of foreign powers. 
"In the court's first fifteen months, ending in December 1980, it approved all 518 
applications, including one order that granted even broader authority than that 
36. In October, 1975, the Senate Intelligence Committee held hearings on the NSA. Bamford relates 
how, in their testimony, "The top three officials of the Agency [Allen, Banner and Buffbam] all agreed 
that NSA exists somewhere in an extralegal limbo, unrestrained by the same laws and statutes that 
govern the rest of the nation .... " [d. at 301. 
37. Three decades after its creation, the NSA is still without a formal, statutory charter, the first 
reform called for by the Church Committee. Instead, there is a super hush-hush surveillance 
court that is virtually impotent; the FISA, which has enough loopholes and exceptions to 
render it nearly useless; and an executive order that was designed more to protect the 
intelligence community from the citizens than citizens from the agencies. In addition, because 
it is an executive order, it can be changed any time at the whim of a President, without so much 
as a nod toward Congress. 
[d. at 378. 
NSCID No.6 gives the NSA the right to ignore legal restraints placed on the rest of government. 
"Orders, directives, policies, or recommendations of any authority of the Executive branch relating to 
the collection ... of intelligence shall not be applicable to Communications Intelligence activities, unless 
specifically so stated .... " NSCID No.6, quoted in id. at 46. So, despite the fact that the Justice 
Department determined that the NSA had violated the Communications Act of 1934 in the course of 
Operation Shamrock, it was forced to conclude that it was not subject to the provisions of that Act (or 
any other Act). [d. at 307. 
For a discussion of the NSA's immunity from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, see 
note 13 supra. 
38. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511 (1978), 92 Stat. 1783 (codified 
at 50 U.S.C. 1801). 
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sought by the Justice Department."39 Since that time, only one application has 
been denied. William Colby argues that this cannot be construed as evidence 
incriminating the court;40 it merely demonstrates that the government is being 
careful about the cases it brings before the surveillance court. It is difficult to 
imagine that, however careful the government may be, it could establish 518 
flawless cases. It seems that the record of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court merits closer scrutiny. 
NSA EFFICIENCY 
Although Bamford does not explore the question of the efficiency of NSA's 
intelligence-gathering at length, he does raise several pertinent questions, 
among them the coordination of targeting, the emphasis on Soviet vs. Third 
World targets, and NSA counter-intelligence procedures. 
NSA listening posts pick up indiscriminately all microwave signals passing 
within their listening range (this has been called the "vacuum cleaner ap-
proach"). Massive computers then sift through raw communications looking for 
certain targeted words or phrases. The crucial step in the process is the decision 
as to which intelligence needs shall be targeted.41 
The various CO MINT consumers - the CIA, FBI, State Department and the 
military intelligence units - all compete to have their intelligence needs met. In 
order to incorporate as many of their needs as possible very broad target items 
are chosen, often at the expense of narrower but more crucial items. "The most 
dramatic evidence of these weaknesses was the failure of COMINT to warn of 
the Korean invasion."42 This problem continues to be a major concern to U.S. 
security. 
Another major problem relating to NSA efficiency is the focus of NSA techni-
cal resources on surveillance of the Soviet Union at the expense of the Third 
World.43 William Colby argues that this concentration of effort is justified since 
the Soviet Union constitutes the gravest threat to U.S. security extant and is 
difficult to penetrate except by the most sophisticated means.44 
This explanation seems inadequate, however, in view of the fact that the 
post-war world's hot-spots have invariably cropped up in the Third World, the 
39. BAMFORD, supra note 2, at 370. 
40. Telephone interview by the authors with William Colby (Oct. 20, 1982). 
41. Targeting is the process of turning intelligence requirements into specific data collection line 
items. For example, if the Army is interested in finding out about drug use by East German soldiers, it 
makes that request to the NSA. The NSA analyst decides what German words or phrases might be used 
in conversations involving drugs and East German soldiers. The NSA computers then look for the use 
of these words while sifting through communications collected by the NSA. Interview with James 
Bamford, published in 7 F(.ETCHER FORUM 205 (1983). 
42. BAMFORD, supra note 2, at 49. 
43. [d. at 212. 
44. Telephone interview by the authors with William Colby (Oct. 20, 1982). 
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most recent examples of course being the Falkland Islands and Lebanon. The 
more convincing argument has been made that intelligence-gathering in Third 
World countries can often be conducted more cost-effectively by other means 
since they are much less difficult to penetrate. 45 One must therefore survey the 
coverage of the Third World by the entire intelligence community in order to 
determine whether there is a need for the use of highly sophisticated NSA 
capabilities or whether other less sophisticated means such as human intelligence 
would be sufficient.46 
The last issue of efficiency which Bamford discusses at length is the inade-
quacy of NSA's own counterintelligence procedures. The fact that this issue 
arises with regard to the NSA is ironic when one considers that at one time its 
very name was classified information.47 Yet, in a lengthy chapter entitled "Pene-
tration," Bamford describes the inadequate security of NSA facilities at Fort 
Meade: 48 "Once on base, anyone from the Soviet ambassador to Yassir Arafat 
can walk up the dozen or so steps and in the reception area, no questions asked, 
take a seat, and begin listening to some very interesting conversations."49 
Bamford details the inadequate personnel screening practices which led to the 
double defection to Moscow of two agency employees in 1960 and other acts of 
treason on the part of NSA personnel. Bamford concludes that the NSA "man-
aged the distinction of becoming not only the most secretive and most hidden 
member of America's growing intelligence consortium, but also the most 
thoroughly penetrated."50 While his statement may perhaps be overdrawn, the 
allegation should not be passed over lightly. 
SEARCHING OUT THE MARGIN 
The strength of Bamford's work lies in the broad and well-documented body 
of information he has gathered for and for the first time made available for 
general public consumption. The Puzzle Palace does not, however, explicitly state 
45. Martin writes that "the Soviets manage to mask as much as 75 percent of their communications 
spectrum - and the remaining 25 percent is available to the NSA only because the Soviets don't think 
it's worth the time and money to protect it." Martin, supra note 15, at 28. 
46. See, e.g., BAMFORD, supra note 2, at 346. Bamford writes: "Of equal or greater importance was 
diplomatic and military intelligence plucked from the Third World. Encrypted, for the most part, on 
antique. inexpensive. or unsophisticated machines, most communications from Africa, South America, 
and Asia were easy pickings for the NSA." [d. 
47. Id. at 2. 
48. /d. at ll8-54. 
49. [d. at 123. Bamford continues: 
Actual examples include several members of Britain's untrasecret GCHQ comparing security 
at NSA with that "in the Cotswolds" while waiting for their security badges to be issued, a 
member of Canada's equally secret Communications Branch of the National Research Council 
(the Canadian Puzzle Palace) swapping stories with his NSA sponsor, and an assortment of 
COMSEC [communications security] contractors speaking over the internal telephones. 
[d. 
50. [d. at 154. 
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its assumptions or provide adequate analysis of the issues it raises. For instance, 
Bamford has assumed that if NSA is in possession of powerful technology it will 
be used toward achieving illegitimate ends. He does not, however, provide an 
adequate defense of his position. Indeed, the evidence he offers, Operations 
Shamrock and Minaret, could equally be used to reaffirm the validity of the 
American system of checks and balances. 
Bamford also mistakes sheer mass for power. While acknowledging that the 
NSA is strictly a technical body, he fails to recognize that ultimate authority lies 
with the policymaker who determines the type of information to be collected. 
Senator Tower charged the Senate Intelligence Committee with falling prey to: 
our own fascination with the technological advances of the computer 
age. We have invited a three star military officer to come before us to 
explain the awesome technology and the potential abuses of a huge 
vacuum cleaner. We have done this despite the fact that our exhaus-
tive investigation has established only two major abuses [Shamrock 
and Minaret] in 23 years, both of which have been terminated.51 
Bamford has seemingly fallen into a similar analytical trap. 
Underlying Bamford's discussion of the inefficiency of NSA intelligence and 
counterintelligence operations is the premise that intelligence activities are nec-
essary to our national security and therefore legitimate. Yet, he nowhere defines 
the appropriate role of the intelligence community or its limitations. Bamford 
does not address the potential risks to national security implicit in revealing the 
internal operations of the NSA. Nor does he build a strong case for the public's 
need to know the information contained in The Puzzle Palace. 
Perhaps the most prominent analytical gap is Bamford's failure to establish 
what is, in his view, an appropriate standard of secrecy. Bamford himself recog-
nizes the need for counterintelligence, i.e., the safeguarding of one's own secrets 
and institutions from penetration by the "enemy." This implies a curb on civil 
liberties. How then does one draw the line between purely domestic matters and 
international concerns? 
There is a margin at which an additional unit of national security will incur a 
cost in civil liberties (and vice versa) which Americans are unprepared to pay. 
Clearly, to perform the implied cost-benefit analysis would entail the impossible 
task of quantifying intangibles. Difficult as this may be, the need to search out 
and define this margin is not obviated. It is a task Bamford has left undone. 
51. Intelligence Activities Hearings, supra note 30, at 4 (statement of Sen. John G. Tower). 
